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of the state constitution, which is self-executing.40 The legislative
amendment to the state code in section 3507.07, which authorizes the
listing of candidates of each political party in a separate or vertical
column, was held unconstitutional.
The constitutional authority to sue the state is not self-executing,
however. The supreme court held that legislation must first be
adopted to allow a tort action by a patient against Ohio State University Hospital. 4' Four judges concurred,42 stating that since there
was no allegation that this state function was proprietary, it should
be treated as being governmental, thereby making the state immune.
Two dissenters43 viewed Ohio Revised Code section 3335.0344 as authorizing this tort action against the University trustees.
The 1955 enactment authorizing a public off-street underground
parking lot on the statehouse grounds45 succumbed to the constitutional requirement in article II, section 26, that a general law must
have uniform operation throughout the state. If the parking were
limited to cars present for state business, the supreme court intimated
that no quo warranto to oust the public commission members would
have been granted.46
Finally, another court held that for constitutional purposes, the
determination of what constitutes "the practice of law" is solely within the power of the judiciary.47
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.

CONTRACTS
FAILURE FOR WANT OF DEFINITENESS

Trammel v. Morgan' involves a dispute between a boxer and his
On April 11, 1955, the boxer's father was appointed
guardian of the person and of the estate of the boxer. The reason
for the guardianship is not disclosed. It is not because of the son's
minority, however, for he was an adult at the time of the appointment.2 On the day of his appointment, the boxer's father, as guardian, entered into a written agreement with the plaintiff-manager.
This agreement provided that the manager was to manage the boxer
manager.

State ex rel. Wesselnan v. Board of Elections, 170 Ohio St. 30, 162 N.E.2d 118 (1959).
Wolf v. Ohio State University Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959).
Id. at 54, 162 N.B.2d at 478 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 54, 162 N.E.2d at 478 (dissenting opinion).
Under this section, the Board of Trustees of The Ohio State University are given "the
as such, of suing and being sued...."
45. OmIo REV. CODE § 5538.01-.21, .99.
46. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Alexander, 168 Ohio St. 404, 155 N.E.2d 678 (1959).
47. In re Unauthorized Practice of Law in Lucas County, 160 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
right

[June

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

and the latter was to fight exclusively for the manager; the contract
was to continue until November 15, 1955. On October 9, 1955, the
manager and the boxer, by endorsement on the original agreement,
sought to extend the original contract. By the terms of the endorsement the manager and the boxer agreed ".. . to continue this contract
for five years after L. C. [the boxer] becomes 21 years old."3 In
addition, the manager agreed to purchase a home for the boxer
* . suitable for his family, at a fair price to be paid out of L. C.'s
'
earnings as a boxer.

4

After performing the original agreement, but before the purchase
of the house, the boxer refused to perform under the extension agreement. The manager thereupon brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of the two agreements. The court of
appeals held that the extension agreement was not enforceable, reasoning that the provision for the purchase of the home was ".

.

. too

indefinite for enforcement, and that the contract never became effective because the purchase of the house by the plaintiff was a requirement precedent to the agreement becoming effective as a binding
contract, no other consideration therefor appearing." 5
There is no disagreement with the court's conclusion that the provision for the purchase of the home was too indefinite and that the
agreement was, therefore, unenforceable. It has long been a principle of contract law that the essential terms of an agreement must be
reasonably certain. However, why the court said there was no other
consideration (and even italicized the "no other") is not clear. It
would seem only natural to infer when parties agree "to continue this
agreement," that they intend that which constituted the consideration
in the original agreement to be adopted and continued in the extension agreement. Further, the court did not comment upon the fact
that the boxer was under guardianship at the time of the extension
agreement. Therefore, one can only speculate as to whether the extension contract also might have been unenforceable because of the
boxer's lack of capacity.
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS

Jisintine & Company v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company6 is the latest case in a long line of Ohio cases to recognize the right of recovery by a creditor-beneficiary in a third party
beneficiary contract. The case is believed to be of interest not so
much for this point, however, as for the fact that the court stated
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

158 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
The trial court found that the boxer was born November 15, 1933.
Trammell v. Morgan, 158 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
Ibid.
Id. at 542.
169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959).
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that it is generally held that either a donee or a creditor-beneficiary may recover. While the statement is admittedly dictum, the
status of third party donee-beneficiary contracts in Ohio has been so
uncertain, outside of the more or less sui generis area of life insurance contracts, that any pronouncement seems significant.
REAL ESTATE BROKER'S COMMISSION

Creta v. Ridgeway' was an action for the recovery of a realty
commission. Ridgeway, the owner of the realty, signed an exclusive
listing contract to sell the property for $10,000 cash. The owner's
wife also signed the listing agreement with the plaintiff-broker. The
property was never sold for cash. However, the broker brought an
offer to purchase the property for $10,000, with a specified down
payment and the remainder payable in monthly installments; this
offer contained the following condition: "This contract subject to
Seller getting a $4500 loan on said property." The owner signed the
above offer. The broker found a building and loan association willing to make the loan to the owner, provided the owner's wife would
sign the mortgage and note to be given by the owner to the association. This the wife refused to do. Consequently, the owner could
not get the loan, the sale was not consummated, and the owner refused to pay the broker his commission. In holding that the broker
could not recover, the court of appeals stated: ". . . [T]he conditions precedent to a binding contract . . ." of sale between seller and
buyers "were not fulfilled ....
That being the ease, Ridgeway [the
owner] was not liable for a commission." 8
Where a real estate broker contracts with the owner of property
to find a purchaser for a commission for his services; produces a
buyer; and the owner enters into a written contract of sale with the
buyer, the real estate broker, in the absence of fraud, is entitled to his
commission, and ". . . is not required to prove that the buyer was
ready, willing and able to consummate the transaction, nor is it a defense that the transaction was never consummated." 9 This was the
0
holding in Retterer v. Bender.1
FUNERAL EXPENSES OF PARENT; CHILD NOT LIABLE

IN QUASI CONTRACT
In Miles v. Wolfe" it was held that in the absence of a true contract, i.e., an express contract or one implied in fact, an adult child
is under no legal duty to pay a funeral director for funeral services
rendered to the child's deceased parent.
7. 161 NX.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
8. Id. at 512.
9. Retterer v. Bender, 106 Ohio App. 369, 374, 154 N.E.2d 827, 831 (1958).
10. Id. at 369, 154 N.E.2d at 827.
11. 155 N.X.2d 287 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1956).

